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作者：Kim, Harim
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Industry-wide shocks can have heterogeneous impacts on firms' costs due to different firm characteristics. The heterogeneity of these impacts is crucial for understanding the pass-through of the shock because of its implications for strategic competition. In the context of the gas price shock in the electricity market, I develop a method to identify the heterogeneous impacts of the shock and show, with a structural analysis, that the heterogeneous feature of the shock induces markup adjustment...
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作者：Barbosa, K. L. E. N. I. O.; De Silva, Dakshina g.; Yang, L. I. Y. U.; Yoshimoto, H. I. S. A. Y. U. K. I.
作者单位：Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; Lancaster University; Nanjing Audit University; University of Glasgow
摘要：This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically differen...
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作者：LIu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：Due to the well-known efficiency-rent extraction trade-off, the optimal mechanism in a pure screening environment (e.g., rev-enue maximization in auctions or cost minimization in procure-ment) typically calls for distortions in allocative efficiency when agents possess private information at the time of contracting. In this paper we introduce first-stage type-enhancing hidden invest-ment to a standard sequential screening model of procurement, and find that (i) with convex investment cost, mit...
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作者：MacKay, Alexander
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The optimal duration of a supply contract balances the costs of re-selecting a supplier against the costs of being matched to an inefficient supplier when the contract lasts too long. I develop a structural model of contract duration that captures this trade-off and provide an empirical strategy for quantifying (unobserved) transaction costs. I estimate the model using federal supply contracts for a standardized product, where suppliers are selected by procurement auctions. The estimated trans...
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作者：Shapiro, Bradley T.
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：It is taken as given by many policy makers that Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of prescription drugs drives inappropriate patients to treatment. Alternatively, advertising may provide useful information that causes appropriate patients to seek treatment. I study this dynamic in the context of antidepressants. Leveraging variation driven by the borders of television markets, I find that a 10 percent increase in antidepressant advertising leads to a 0.3 percent ($32 million) increase in new pres...
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作者：Fukuda, Satoshi; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study negotiations with limited specifiability-each party may not be able to fully specify a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative statics on specifiability as well as move structures. We find that asynchronicity of proposal announcements narrows down the equilibrium payoff set, in particular, leading to a unique prediction in negotiations with a common interest alternative. The equilibrium payoff set is not a singleton in general, and dep...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Information regulation that penalizes deceptive communication by firms can have significant unintended consequences. We consider a market where competing firms communicate private information about product quality through a combination of pricing and direct communication (advertising or labeling) that may be false. A higher fine for lying reduces the reliance on price signaling, thereby lowering market power and consumption distortions; however, it may lead to excessive disclosure. Low fines a...
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作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asu
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals infor-mation about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sha...
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作者：Akin, S. Nuray; Platt, Brennan C.
作者单位：Ozyegin University; Brigham Young University
摘要：We study a dynamic equilibrium search model where sellers differ in their urgency to liquidate an asset. Buyers strategically make price offers without knowing a given seller's urgency. We study liquidity and price dynamics on the transition path after an unex-pected shock. Generically, the transition includes a phase where all buyers offer the same price, causing a market collapse; how-ever, price dispersion resumes in finite time, leading to a recovery where both types make sales. We show th...
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作者：Levit, Doron; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Toronto; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is pri-vately informed about agents' payoffs from the policy and his conflict of interest. We show that one-size-fits-all recommendations can be informative even when payoffs are independent across agents. Such recommendations increase the expert's i...
