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作者：Calleja, Pedro; Rafels, Carles; Tijs, Stef
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggre...
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作者：Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Barcelona
摘要：To any assignment market we associate the unique exact assignment game defined on the same set of agents and with a core that is a translation of the core of the initial market. As it happens with the core, the kernel and the nucleolus of an assignment game are proved to be the translation of the kernel and the nucleolus of its related exact assignment game by the vector of minimum core payoffs. Agents on each side of the market are classified by means of an equivalence relation and, when agen...
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作者：Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper proves the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games: for a generic assignment of utilities to networks, the set of probability distributions on networks induced by Nash equilibria is finite. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bjornerstedt, Jonas; Westermark, Andreas
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon bargaining between a seller and multiple buyers when externalities are present. We extend the analysis in Jehiel and Moldovanu by allowing for both pure and mixed equilibria [Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B., 1995a. Cyclical delay in bargaining with externalities. Rev. Econ. Stud. 62, 619-637]. A characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibria in generic games is presented. Equilibria with delay exist only for strong positive externalities. Since each...
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作者：Herold, Florian; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very ...
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作者：Rapoport, Amnon; Kugler, Tamar; Dugar, Subhasish; Gisches, Eyran J.
作者单位：University of Arizona; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Calgary; University of Arizona
摘要：The Braess Paradox consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Both experiments include relatively large groups of participants who independently and repeatedly choose ...
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作者：Rutstroem, E. Elisabet; Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Houston System; University of Houston; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：Belief elicitation in game experiments may be problematic if it changes game play. We experimentally Verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a two-player repeated asymmetric matching pennies game. Importantly, this effect occurs only during early periods and only for players with strongly asymmetric payoffs, consistent with a cognitive/affective effect on priors that may serve as a substitute for experience. These effects occur with a common scoring rule elicitation procedure...
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Singh, Nirvikar
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：The efficiency-enhancing role of the vengeance motive is illustrated in a simple social dilemma game in extensive form. Incorporating behavioral noise and observational noise in random interactions in large groups leads to seven continuous families of (short run) Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) that involve both vengeful and non-vengeful types. A new long run evolutionary equilibrium concept, Evolutionary Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (EPBE), shrinks the equilibrium set to two points. In one ...
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作者：Bhaskar, V.
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper examine,,.,, leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders' actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders' actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive profits; however ...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Paris 13; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; heSam Universite; Conservatoire National Arts & Metiers (CNAM); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
