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作者：Mezzetti, Claudio; Tsetlin, Ilia
作者单位：University of Warwick; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We Study auctions of a single asset among symmetric bidders with affiliated values. We show that the second-price auction minimizes revenue among all efficient auction mechanisms in which only the winner pays, and the price only depends oil the losers' bids. In particular, we show that the kth price auction generates higher revenue than the second-price auction. for all k > 2. If rationing is allowed, with shares of the asset rationed among the t highest bidders, then the (t + 1)st price aucti...
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Rego, Leandro C.
作者单位：Universidade Federal de Pernambuco; Cornell University; Cornell University
摘要：Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We extend Fagin and Halpern's logic of general awareness to a logic that allows quantification over variables, so that there is a formula in the language that says an agent explicitly knows...
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作者：De Sinopoli, Francesco; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are ill dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium ill undominated strategies. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lim, Wooyoung; Matros, Alexander
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0 < p <= 1 of participating. A unique symmetric equilibrium is found for any n and p and its properties are analyzed. In particular, we show that for a fixed n > 2 individual equilibrium spending as a function of p is single-peaked and satisfies a single-crossing property for any two different numbers of potential players. However, total equilibrium spending is monotonically increasing in p and n. We als...
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作者：Suvorov, Anton; van de Ven, Jeroen
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; New Economic School
摘要：This paper Studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance impe...
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作者：Majumdar, Mukul
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：The paper is a review of some of the themes to which David Gale made lasting contributions. it touches upon a number of the fundamental issues in the Walrasian equilibrium theory (existence, uniqueness and stability), the overlapping generations model (non-optimality and indeterminacy of competitive equilibria), the von Neumann equilibrium (as a turnpike), and in the theory of decentralized intertemporal allocation through competitive prices (efficiency and golden rules, duality and existence ...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; McLean, Richard; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We investigate how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken. We show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents' signals are sufficiently accurate or when the number of informed agents become large. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substant...
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作者：Peleg, Bezalel; Peters, Hans
作者单位：Maastricht University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives are considered. It is shown that every monotonic and superadditive effectivity function can be augmented with equal chance lotteries to a finite lottery model-i.e., an effectivity function that preserves the original effectivity in terms Of Supports of lotteries-which has a Nash consistent representation. The latter means that there exists a finite game form which represents the lottery model and which has a Nash equilibrium for ...
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作者：Pokladnikova, Vlasta; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：It is a common fear in many countries that ideological parties will come to power through elections but will implement extreme policies. Many countries cope with this problem by overriding the election results when such parties are elected. We demonstrate that the alternative approach of containing these parties within the democratic system is more effective. We show that, as the probability of state's intervention in the next elections increases, an ideological party implements a more extreme...
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作者：Adriani, Fabrizio; Deidda, Luca G.
作者单位：University of London; University of London School Oriental & African Studies (SOAS); University of Sassari
摘要：We analyze trade between a perfectly informed price setting party (seller) and an imperfectly informed price taker (buyer). Differently from most of the literature. we focus on the case in which, under full information, it would be inefficient to trade goods of sufficiently poor quality. We show that the unique equilibrium surviving D1 is characterized by market breakdown, although trade would be mutually beneficial in some state of nature. This occurs independently of the precision of the inf...
