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作者：Sobel, Joel; von Stengel, Bernhard
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作者：Hofbauer, Josef; Oechssler, Joerg; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Vienna; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum,carries with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics are a benchmark example for myopic adjustment dynamics that, in contrast to replicator dynamics. allow for innovation, but require less rationality than the best response dynamics. This paper studies the BNN dynamics f...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias; Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; University of Gothenburg; Maastricht University; Tilburg University
摘要：We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories, Nash stationarity, positive correlation with payoffs, and innovation. Sufficient conditions are provided under which strictly dominated strategies are wiped ...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Fajardo, Jose
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu games, known to be Sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make, discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes) the existence theorem of [Simon, ...
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作者：Andelman, Nir; Feldman, Michal; Mansour, Yishay
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum.. Differently front the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination. We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and ...
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作者：Halbheer, Daniel; Fehr, Ernst; Goette, Lorenz; Schmutzler, Armin
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Zurich; University of Geneva; University of Zurich
摘要：Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, bu...
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作者：Shunda, Nicholas
作者单位：University Redlands
摘要：In an auction with a buy price, the seller provides bidders with an option to end the auction early by accepting a transaction at a posted price. This paper develops a model of an auction with a buy price in which bidders use the auction's reserve price and buy price to formulate a reference price. The model both explains why a revenue-maximizing seller would want to augment her auction with a buy price and demonstrates that the seller sets a higher reserve price when she can affect the bidder...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Heidhues, Paul; Lafky, Jonathan; Muenster, Johannes; Zhang, Meixia
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Free University of Berlin; Princeton University
摘要：This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there tire at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum Valuation. In this class, above a threshold Value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below ...
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作者：Ozyurt, Selcuk; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Istanbul Bilgi University; New York University
摘要：A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice...
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作者：Bergin, James; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom suggests that when agent's interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: keeping up with the Jones' lowers everyones' welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequences of imitative behavior when agents have sufficiently long memories and evaluate past actions in terms of (weighted) average payoff. Im...
