-
作者：Driessen, Theo; Hu, Cheng-Cheng
作者单位：University of Twente; Southern Taiwan University of Science & Technology
摘要：In the framework of (set-valued or single-valued) solutions for coalitional games with transferable utility, the three notions of consistency, bilateral consistency, and converse consistency are frequently used to provide axiomatic characterizations of a particular solution (like the core, prekernel, prenucleolus, Shapley value). Our main equivalence theorem claims that a solution satisfies consistency (with respect to an arbitrary reduced game) if and only if the solution satisfies both bilat...
-
作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Fischbacher, Urs
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Konstanz; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows US to Study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Fin...
-
作者：Shellshear, Evan; Sudholter, Peter
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; University of Bielefeld
摘要：If a TU game is extendable, then its core is a stable set. However, there are many TU games with a stable core that are not extendable. A coalition is vital if there exists some core element x such that none of the proper subcoalitions is effective for x. It is exact if it is effective for some core element. If all coalitions that are vital and exact are extendable, then the game has a stable core. It is shown that the contrary is also valid for matching games, for simple flow games, and for m...
-
作者：Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：Hatfield and Milgrom [Hatfield, John William, Milgrom, Paul R., 2005. Matching with contracts. Amer. Econ. Rev. 95, 913-935] present a unified model of matching with contracts, which includes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models as special cases. They show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is strategy-proof for doctors if hospitals' preferences satisfy substitutes and the law of aggregate demand. We show that the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is group strate...
-
作者：Azrieli, Yaron
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the efficiency of categorization of other agents as a way of saving cognitive resources in the settings of a large normal-form game. We assume that, when an agent categorizes (partitions) her opponents, she only has information about the average strategy in each category. A strategy profile is a conjectural categorical equilibrium (CCE) with respect to a given categorization profile if every player's strategy is a best response to some consistent conjecture about the strategies of her...
-
作者：Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno; Ule, Aljaz
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; California Institute of Technology; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal [Bala, V., Goyal, S., 2000. A non-cooperative model of network formation, Econometrica 68, 1131-1230] model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by introducing agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (e...
-
作者：Nash, John F., Jr.
作者单位：Princeton University
-
作者：Rauh, Michael T.
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In this paper, we apply supermodular game theory to the equilibrium search literature with sequential search. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for the pricing game to exhibit strategic complementarities and prove existence of equilibrium. We then show that price dispersion is inherently incompatible with strategic complementarities in the sense that the Diamond Paradox obtains when firms are identical and is robust within the class of search cost densities that are small near ze...
-
作者：Conley, John P.; Neilson, William
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We consider a situation in which games are formed endogenously in two senses: (1) there is a pregame in which agents choose to learn I Subset of all feasible strategies and can then employ only these strategies in Subsequent play, and (2) agents choose their game partners through a costly search process. We show that at any subgame perfect equilibrium, agents will constrain their action sets in the pregame in such a way that a single social norm prevails. Thus, all agents in a society will abi...
-
作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study Blackwell's approachability in repeated games with vector payoffs when the approaching player is restricted to use strategies with bounded memory: either strategies with bounded recall, or strategies that can be implemented by finite automata. Our main finding is that the following three statements are equivalent for closed sets, (i) The set is approachable with bounded recall strategies. (ii) The set is approachable with strategies that can be implemented with finite automata. (iii) ...
