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作者：de la Rosa, Leonidas Enrique
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：In this paper, I study the effects of overconfidence on incentive contracts in a moral-hazard framework. Agent overconfidence can have conflicting effects on the equilibrium contract. On the one hand, an optimistic or overconfident agent disproportionately values success-contingent payments, and thus prefers higher-powered incentives. On the other hand, if the agent overestimates the extent to which his actions affect outcomes, lower-powered incentives are sufficient to induce any given effort...
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the bidders' incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskin's (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cubitt, Robin P.; Sugden, Robert
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper presents a new iterative procedure for solving finite non-cooperative games, the reasoning-based expected utility procedure (RBEU), and compares this with existing iterative procedures. RBEU deletes more strategies than iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, while avoiding the conceptual problems associated with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. It uses a sequence of accumulation and deletion operations to categorise strategies as permissible and impermi...
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作者：Granot, Daniel; Hamers, Herbert; Kuipers, Jeroen; Maschler, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Tilburg University; Maastricht University
摘要：We study the extended Chinese postman (CP) cooperative game induced by a connected, weighted, undirected graph G. wherein a postman, starting from a post office location, needs to traverse all edges wherein players reside, before returning to the post-office. We characterize the graphs associated with all CP games in which the players on a road pay exactly the cost of the road at each core point, regardless of the number of players residing on the road, the location of the post-office and the ...
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作者：Stein, Noah D.; Parrilo, Pablo A.; Ozdaglar, Asuman
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe; Rutter, Tom
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main findings are: 1) In the presence of feedback spillover, long run behaviors stabilize to an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005). 2) Faced with the same objective feedback, the long run behavi...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Vienna; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam
摘要：There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decisi...
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作者：Bag, Parimal Kanti; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of East Anglia
摘要：Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the 'lemons' (i.e., the influential punter) in. On the other hand, sometimes the bookies make zero profits bu...
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作者：Masso, Jordi; de Barreda, Ines Moreno
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strateg...
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Pauzner, Ady
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study a private-values buyer-seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
