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作者：Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stochastic myopic best-reply dynamics is said to have property (W), for a given number of players n, if every pure weakly dominated strategy in every n-player game is eliminated in the long-run distribution of play induced by the dynamics. In this paper I give a necessary and sufficient condition that a dynamics has to satisfy in order for it to have property (W). The key determinant is found to be the sensitivity of the learning-rate to small payoff differences, inherent in the dynamics. If...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Brown University
摘要：We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or best-responses. First, we show that a necessary condition for recurrent implementation in better-response dynamics (BRD) is a small variation of Maskin monotonicity, which we call quasimonotonicity. We also provide a mechanism for implementation in BRD if the rule is quasimonotonic and excludes worst alternatives - no worst alternative ...
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作者：Chien, Steve; Sinclair, Alistair
作者单位：Microsoft; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study the ability of decentralized, local dynamics in non-cooperative games to rapidly reach an approximate (pure) Nash equilibrium. Our main result states that for symmetric congestion games in which the cost function associated with each resource satisfies a bounded jump condition, convergence to an epsilon-Nash equilibrium occurs within a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of players and epsilon(-1). We show moreover that this result holds under a variety of conventions gov...
