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作者：Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We consider repeated trust game experiments to study the interplay between explicit and relational incentives. After having gained experience with two payoff variations of the trust game, subjects in the final part explicitly choose which of these two variants to play. Theory predicts that subjects will choose the payoff dominated game (representing a bad explicit contract), because this game better sustains (implicit) relational incentives backed by either reputational or reciprocity consider...
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作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Calvo-Armengol, Antoni; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Stockholm University; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：The aim of this paper is to provide a tractable model where both socialization (or network formation) and productive efforts can be analyzed simultaneously. This permits a full-fledged equilibrium/welfare analysis of network formation with endogenous productive efforts and heterogeneous agents. We show that there exist two stable interior equilibria, which we can Pareto rank. The socially efficient outcome lies between these two equilibria. When the intrinsic returns to production and socializ...
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作者：Shahriar, Quazi; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Arizona; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：eBay's Buy It Now format allows a seller to list an auction with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately and end the auction. When bidders are risk averse, then theoretically a buy price can raise seller revenue when values are private (but not when values are common). We report the results of laboratory experiments designed to determine whether in practice a buy price is advantageous to the seller. We find that a suitably chosen buy price yields a substantial increase ...
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作者：Jaeger, Gerhard; Metzger, Lars P.; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; Eberhard Karls University of Tubingen; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into contiguous cells. We give a full characterization of the strict Nash equilibria of this game as Voronoi languages. As the strategy set is infinite static stability concepts for finite games such as ESS are no longer sufficient for Lyapunov stability in th...
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作者：Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study how aggregate effort exerted in contests between groups of heterogeneous players depends on the sorting of players into groups. We show that the optimal sorting depends on the curvature of the effort cost function. From the perspective of a contest organizer whose objective is to maximize aggregate effort, it is optimal to sort players in a way that minimizes the variation in ability across groups if the effort cost function is moderately steep. However, for a sufficiently steep effor...
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作者：Blanco, Mariana; Engelmann, Dirk; Normann, Hans Theo
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Universidad del Rosario; University of Copenhagen; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Max Planck Society
摘要：We assess the predictive power of a model of other-regarding preferences inequality aversion using a within-subject design. We run four different experiments (ultimatum game, dictator game, sequential-move prisoners' dilemma and public-good game) with the same sample of subjects. We elicit two parameters of inequality aversion to test several hypotheses across games. We find that within-subject tests can differ markedly from aggregate-level analyses. Inequality-aversion has predictive power at...
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作者：Fiedler, Marina; Haruvy, Ernan; Li, Sherry Xin
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University of Passau
摘要：We conduct a quasi-field experiment in a virtual world environment to investigate the impact of social distance on economic choices. We design trust games with partner selection, in which the proposer chooses between a familiar responder and a stranger with a higher multiplier. When choosing between the two responders, the proposer faces tradeoffs between economic opportunities and social distance. Comparing participants' behaviors to those in a standalone trust game, we find that in the virtu...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper considers some package auctions with known single-minded bidders. A single-minded bidder is interested in a unique bundle of goods and bids only for that bundle. We examine each bidder's incentive in Ausubel and Milgrom's (2002) ascending proxy auction and every bidder-optimal core-selecting auction. We provide a simple condition for each bidder to report his valuation truthfully, which can be expressed in a single sentence any rival of my rivals is my rival. The Vickrey outcome lie...
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作者：Ivanov, Asen
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University
摘要：Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether subjects are risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse. The third dimension is about whether subjects are naive or strategic. Our main result is that, in our main treatment, 32/46/22 percent of subjects a...
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作者：Javier Martinez-de-Albeniz, F.; Nunez, Marina; Rafels, Carles
作者单位：University of Barcelona
摘要：In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduc...
