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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad de Malaga; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. This important fact is known as the median voter result. Variants of it also apply when single-peakedness fails, but preferences verify other domain restrictions, such as single-crossing, intermediateness or order restriction. Austen-Smith and Banks (1999) also proved that t...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Gaechter, Simon; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
作者单位：University of Nottingham; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bonn; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg
摘要：Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2 x 2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject's first- and second-order beliefs and contributions. From a psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributi...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Du, Ninghua; Yang, Chun-Lei
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：Trust is an essential component of good social outcomes and effective economic performance. Reputation on the trustee's past behavior in the same role has proven to be greatly effective at raising the level of trust. In this study, we show that providing information on the trustee's past behavior as the trustor is equally effective as a reputation system. In fact, people still find it worthwhile to invest in a reputation as a trusting person, even though the immediate payoff for trusting is po...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher, 1999; Asheim, 2001) is a concept in epistemic game theory based on the following two conditions: (a) a player should be cautious, that is, should not exclude any opponent's strategy from consideration; and (b) a player should respect the opponents' preferences, that is, should deem an opponent's strategy s(i) infinitely more likely than s(i)' if he believes the opponent to prefer s(i) to s(i)'. A strategy is properly rationalizable if it can optimally be ...
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作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Cassar, Alessandra; Rigdon, Mary
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of San Francisco
摘要：This paper focuses on the interaction between network structure, the role of information, and the level of trust and trustworthiness in 3-node networks. We extend the investment game with one Sender and one Receiver to networked versions - one characterized by one Sender and two Receivers ([1S-2R]) and one characterized by two Senders and one Receiver ([2S-1R]) - under two information conditions, full and partial. We develop a comparative model of trust for the networked exchange environments ...
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作者：Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
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作者：Comino, Stefano; Manenti, Fabio M.; Nicolo, Antonio
作者单位：University of Udine; University of Padua
摘要：The theoretical literature on the cumulative innovation process has emphasized the role of ex-ante licensing - namely, licensing agreements negotiated before the follow-on innovator has sunk its R&D investment - in mitigating the risk of hold-up of future innovations. In this paper, we consider a patent-holder and a follow-on innovator bargaining over the licensing terms in a context where the former firm is unable to observe the timing of the R&D investment of the latter. We show that the pos...
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作者：Walker, Mark; Wooders, John; Amir, Rabah
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：We study two-person extensive form games, or matches, in which the only possible outcomes (if the game terminates) are that one player or the other is declared the winner. The winner of the match is determined by the winning of points, in point games. We call these matches binary Markov games. We show that if a simple monotonicity condition is satisfied, then (a) it is a Nash equilibrium of the match for the players, at each point, to play a Nash equilibrium of the point game; (b) it is a mini...
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作者：Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo; Ponti, Giovanni; Tomas, Josefa; Ubeda, Luis
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：This paper studies, both theoretically and experimentally, framing effects in the context of a public good game in which players have to make a costly contribution either (i) to achieve or (ii) not to lose a non-excludable monetary prize. Our protocol leads to public good provision (not deterioration) only if a certain contribution level is achieved. Since both frames differ with respect to the reference point, we apply Prospect Theory to derive testable predictions. In particular, Prospect Th...
