Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Buisseret, Peter
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 494-506
• 关键词: Run-off; Electoral competition; entry deterrence

摘要

I study electoral competition between established parties under threat of entry by a challenger under non-majoritarian run-off elections. In contrast with classical majoritarian run-off elections, I show how non-majoritarian rules can facilitate two-party systems, including those in which the established parties deter the challenger's entry by adopting differentiated platforms. I also show that non-majoritarian run-off rules may facilitate entry deterrence by established parties in settings where a plurality rule cannot. My results provide a striking counterpoint to a conventional wisdom embodied, most notably, in Duverger's Hypothesis that associates run-off rules with multi-party systems. Finally, they provide a theoretical foundation for patterns of electoral competition observed in countries using non-majoritarian rules that contradict this conventional wisdom. Published by Elsevier Inc.