Small, yet Beautiful: Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Kim, Sang-Hyun
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Yonsei University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.012
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 486-493
• 关键词: Contest design; Multiple winner; group-size; Selection mechanism

摘要

We reconsider whether a grand multi-winner contest elicits more equilibrium effort than a collection of sub-contests. Fu and Lu (2009) employ a sequential winner-selection mechanism and find support for running a grand contest. We show that this result is completely reversed if a simultaneous winner-selection mechanism or a sequential loser elimination mechanism is implemented. We then discuss the optimal allocation of players and prizes among sub-contests. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.