Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arzumanyan, Mariam; Polborn, Mattias K.
• 署名单位: Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.016
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 38-50
• 关键词: Costly voting; Endogenous participation models

摘要

We analyze a costly voting model with multiple candidates under plurality rule. In equilibrium, the set of candidates is partitioned into a set of relevant candidates (which contains at least two candidates) and the remaining candidates. All relevant candidates receive votes and have an equal chance of winning, independent of their popular support levels. The remaining candidates do not receive any votes. Furthermore, all voters who cast votes do so for their most preferred candidate, i.e., there is no strategic voting. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.