Multicandidate elections: Aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouton, Laurent; Castanheira, Micael; Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
• 署名单位: Georgetown University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 132-150
• 关键词: Rational voter model; Multicandidate elections; Plurality; aggregate uncertainty; experiments

摘要

The rational-voter model is often criticized on the grounds that two of its central predictions (the paradox of voting and Duverger's Law) are at odds with reality. Recent theoretical advances suggest that these empirically unsound predictions might be an artifact of an (arguably unrealistic) assumption: the absence of aggregate uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate. In this paper, we propose direct empirical evidence of the effects of aggregate uncertainty in multicandidate elections. Adopting a theory-based experimental approach, we explore whether aggregate uncertainty indeed favors the emergence of non-Duverger's law equilibria in plurality elections. Our experimental results support the main theoretical predictions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.