Sincere voting in large elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Acharya, Avidit; Meirowitz, Adam
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 121-131
• 关键词: Informative voting; Sincere voting; strategic voting

摘要

Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a no evidence type. The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the electorate is large enough, then each of the two standard Condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type-symmetric equilibrium. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.