Jumping the queue: An experiment on procedural preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dold, Malte; Khadjavi, Menusch
• 署名单位: University of Freiburg; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); University of Kiel
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 127-137
• 关键词: Laboratory experiment; Procedural preferences; inequality aversion; queuing

摘要

We present a three-player queuing game to study procedural preferences in a laboratory experiment. Together with markets, queues and waiting lists are universal procedures for allocating goods and services. We designed our queuing game to disentangle motivations of outcome-oriented egoistic preferences, outcome-oriented distributional (inequality aversion) preferences and outcome-independent procedural preferences. In a series of treatments, we introduce a market element and allow two of the three players to bargain over a queue jump, thus violating the queuing procedure. A third player is able to engage in peer punishment to sanction queue jumping. We provide evidence that a simple model of procedural preferences is able to explain the behavior of a share of the subjects in our experiment. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.