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作者：Haefner, Samuel
作者单位：University of Basel
摘要：This paper analyzes a tug-of-war contest between two teams. In each round of the tug-of-war, a pair of agents from the opposing teams competes in a private value all-pay auction with asymmetric value distributions and effort effectiveness. Whichever team arrives first at a given lead in terms of battle victories over the opponent wins the tug-of-war. There exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium in bidding strategies which depend on the respective player's valuation and the current state of...
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作者：Gneezy, Uri; Gravert, Christina; Saccardo, Silvia; Tausch, Franziska
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; University of Gothenburg; Carnegie Mellon University; Max Planck Society
摘要：We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedb...
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作者：Sobel, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Consider a finite two-player game with one round of communication. Restrict players to a subset of monotonic strategies. The paper justifies this restriction. The paper provides sufficient conditions under which the strategies of the restricted game that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies favor the agent who can communicate. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Alvarez-Mozos, M.; Alonso-Meijide, J. M.; Fiestras-Janeiro, M. G.
作者单位：University of Barcelona; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Thompson, David R. M.; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：After experimentation with other designs, major search engines converged on weighted, generalized second-price auctions (wGSPs) for selling keyword advertisements. Theoretical analysis is still not able to settle the question of why they found this design preferable to other alternatives. We approach this question in a new way, adopting an analytical paradigm we dub computational mechanism analysis. Specifically, we sample position auction games from a given distribution, encode them in a comp...
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作者：Dufwenberg, Martin; Patel, Amrish
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Gothenburg; University of Arizona; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Reciprocity can be a powerful motivation for human behaviour. Scholars have argued that it is relevant in the context of private provision of public goods. We examine whether reciprocity can resolve the associated coordination problem. The interaction of reciprocity with cost-sharing is critical. Neither cost-sharing nor reciprocity in isolation can solve the problem, but together they have that potential. We introduce new network notions of reciprocity relations to better understand this. (C)...
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作者：Wright, James R.; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：It is commonly assumed that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium strategies; however, experimental studies have demonstrated that this is often a poor description of human players' behavior in unrepeated normal-form games. We analyze five widely studied models of human behavior: Quantal Response Equilibrium, Level-k, Cognitive Hierarchy, QLk, and Noisy Introspection. We performed what we believe is the most comprehensive meta-analysis of these models, leveraging ten datasets from the literature ...
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作者：Arechar, Antonio A.; Dreber, Anna; Fudenberg, Drew; Rand, David G.
作者单位：Yale University; Stockholm School of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We let participants indicate their intended action in a repeated game experiment where actions are implemented with errors. Even though communication is cheap talk, we find that the majority of messages were honest (although the majority of participants lied at least occasionally). As a result, communication has a positive effect on cooperation when the payoff matrix makes the returns to cooperation high; when the payoff matrix gives a lower return to cooperation, communication reduces overall...
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作者：Perea, Andres; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Maastricht University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：For a given epsilon > 0, the concept of epsilon-proper rationalizability (Schuhmacher, 1999) is based on two assumptions: (1) every player is cautious, i.e., does not exclude any opponent's choice from consideration, and (2) every player satisfies the epsilon-proper trembling condition, i.e., the probability he assigns to an opponent's choice a is at most epsilon times the probability he assigns to b whenever he believes the opponent to prefer b to a. In this paper we show that a belief hierar...
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作者：Rosar, Frank
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：An agent who is imperfectly informed about his binary quality can voluntarily participate in a test that generates a public signal. I study the design of the test that allows for optimal learning of the agent's quality when the agent strives for a high perception of his quality but is averse towards perception risk. For a large class of reduced-form utility functions that reflect these properties, the optimal test is binary and not subject to false positives. I uncover the forces that drive th...
