A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
• 署名单位: Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.007
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 34-48
• 关键词: privacy; auctions; incentive compatibility; mechanism design; interdependent values; ex post incentive compatibility; Informational size

摘要

Much of the literature on mechanism design and implementation uses the revelation principle to restrict attention to direct mechanisms. We showed in McLean and Postlewaite (2014) that when agents are informationally small, there exist small modifications to VCG mechanisms in interdependent value problems that restore incentive compatibility. We show here how one can construct a two-stage non-direct mechanism that similarly restores incentive compatibility while improving upon the direct one stage mechanism in terms of privacy and the size of messages that must be sent. The first stage that elicits the part of the agents' private information that induces interdependence can be used to transform certain other interdependent value problems into private value problems. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.