Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Luhan, Wolfgang J.; Poulsen, Anders U.; Roos, Michael W. M.
• 署名单位: University of Portsmouth; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Ruhr University Bochum
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.016
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 687-699
• 关键词: Bargaining; Payoff focality; Coordination complexity

摘要

We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.