Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kumano, Taro
• 署名单位: Yokohama National University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 230-240
• 关键词: Matching; STABILITY; EFFICIENCY; Nash implementation; Indifferences

摘要

In this study, we consider priority-based matching problems in which indifferent priorities are allowed. Although indifferences in priorities are naturally present in practice, it is unknown whether constrained efficient stable matchings are implementable in any strategic solution concept. Therefore, in this study, we show that (1) stable matchings are Nash implementable via a practical mechanism and (2) constrained efficient stable matchings are Nash implementable if and only if priorities satisfy the conditions identified by Ehlers and Erdil (2010). These findings immediately imply that efficient and stable matchings are Nash implementable under the same condition. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.