Reaching consensus through approval bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laslier, Jean-Francois; Nunez, Matias; Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.04.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 241-251
• 关键词: Approval voting; bargaining; Partial honesty; Consensual equilibrium

摘要

In the Approval Bargaining game, two players bargain over a finite set of alternatives. To this end, each one simultaneously submits a utility function u jointly with a real number a; by doing so she approves the lotteries whose expected utility according to u is at least a. The lottery to be implemented is randomly selected among the most approved ones. We first prove that there is an equilibrium where players truthfully reveal their utility function. We also show that, in any equilibrium, the equilibrium outcome is approved by both players. Finally, every equilibrium is sincere and Pareto efficient as long as both players are partially honest. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.