Limited rationality and the strategic environment: Further theory and experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cooper, Kristen B.; Schneider, Henry S.; Waldman, Michael
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.014
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 188-208
• 关键词: Limited rationality; Strategic complements and substitutes; Beauty contest; Convergence to equilibrium; theory; experiment

摘要

The psychology and behavioral economics literatures show that real world decision making at the individual level is frequently inconsistent with the rational actor model. An important question is therefore the extent to which a proportion of agents who make mistakes affects market level outcomes. Previous theoretical and experimental research showed that market level outcomes are less likely to match the rational actor model in settings characterized by strategic complementarity and more likely in settings characterized by strategic substitutability. We extend this research both theoretically and experimentally by introducing important real world complications - specifically, periodic shocks to the payoff structure and a periodic inflow of inexperienced players. We find that these complications can significantly slow convergence to rational actor equilibrium play, possibly even indefinitely. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.