Lying opportunities and incentives to lie: Reference dependence versus reputation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feess, Eberhard; Kerzenmacher, Florian
• 署名单位: Victoria University Wellington; Frankfurt School Finance & Management
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 274-288
• 关键词: Dishonesty; Truth-telling; Lying; Reputation models; loss aversion; Experimental economics

摘要

Recent experiments on lying behavior show that the lying frequency in case of low outcomes increases in the ex-ante probability of high outcomes. This finding is in line with models consisting of internal lying costs and external reputation costs and rejects certain other models, but does not allow for a clean test of models with reference dependent loss aversion. To compare the explanatory power of reputation models and loss aversion models, we manipulate the ex-ante probability that lying is possible at all. We show that the reputation model predicts that the lying frequency decreases in the probability that lying is possible, while the loss aversion model predicts the opposite. Our experimental results strongly support the reputation model. From an applied perspective, our results suggest that reducing the probability that lying is possible may be counterproductive. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.