On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ellis, Andrew
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.07.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 241-249
• 关键词: Ambiguity; incomplete information; dynamic consistency; strategic interaction

摘要

I consider static, incomplete information games where players may not be ambiguity neutral. Every player is one of a finite set of types, and each knows her own type but not that of the other players. Ex ante, players differ only in their taste for outcomes. If every player is dynamically consistent with respect to her own information structure and respects Consequentialism, then players act as if expected utility for uncertainty about types. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.