Errors can increase cooperation in finite populations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zhang, Huanren
• 署名单位: New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.023
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 203-219
• 关键词: cooperation; prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary game theory; evolutionary dynamics; uncertainty; learning; bounded rationality

摘要

I use an evolutionary game to investigate how the level of noise influences cooperation and efficiency in a dynamic setting. Players choose strategies to play indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemmas; the strategies are represented by finite automata, and complexity costs are imposed. Players update their strategies based on the successfulness of the strategies. Using both theoretical analysis and computational experiments, I show that the presence of noise dramatically changes the system dynamics. The effect of noise interacts with the benefit of cooperation: noise can increase cooperation, but only when its level is low and the benefit of cooperation is high. In the noise-free environment, I observe constant oscillations between cooperation and defection. In contrast, the presence of noise makes Win-Stay Lose-Shift (WSLS) a successful strategy when the benefit of cooperation is sufficiently high, making cooperation relatively stable and leading to an efficient outcome. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.