Free intermediation in resource transmission

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Han, Lining; Juarez, Ruben
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; University of Hawaii System
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.006
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 75-84
• 关键词: Resource-sharing; intermediation; Bertrand competition

摘要

We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and the planner optimally selects a subset of them to assist in the transmission of the resource. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a perfectly competitive equilibrium in which intermediaries selected by the planner collect no fees. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient for the uniqueness of an equilibrium with the property that intermediaries not selected by the planner post zero prices. Furthermore, these conditions are necessary and sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium when intermediaries who are not selected post fees equal to zero. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.