Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Miller, Luis; Montero, Maria; Vanberg, Christoph
• 署名单位: University of Basque Country; University of Nottingham; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 60-92
• 关键词: Legislative bargaining; Majority rule; unanimity rule; Risk of breakdown; experiments

摘要

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous 'disagreement value'. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanimity rule, equilibrium payoffs are strictly increasing in disagreement values. Under all less-than-unanimity rules, expected payoffs are either decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in disagreement values. We conduct experiments involving three players using majority and unanimity rule,,finding qualitative support for several, but not all, of our main predictions. Having a high disagreement value is indeed an advantage under unanimity rule. Under majority rule, the player with the highest disagreement value is more likely to be excluded, but this does not consistently result in a lower average payoff. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.