Money as minimal complexity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dubey, Pradeep; Sahi, Siddhartha; Shubik, Martin
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Yale University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; The Santa Fe Institute
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 432-451
• 关键词: Exchange mechanism; Minimal complexity; money

摘要

We consider mechanisms that provide the opportunity to exchange commodity i for commodity j, for certain ordered pairs ij. Given any connected graph G of opportunities, we show that there is a unique G-mechanism that satisfies some natural conditions of fairness and convenience. Next we define time and price complexity for any G-mechanism as (respectively) the time required to exchange i for j, and the information needed to determine the exchange ratio (each for the worst pair ij). If the number of commodities exceeds three, there are precisely three minimally complex G -mechanisms, where G corresponds to the star, cycle and complete graphs. The star mechanism has a distinguished commodity - the money - that serves as the sole medium of exchange and mediates trade between decentralized markets for the other commodities. Furthermore, for any weighted sum of complexities, the star mechanism is the unique minimizer of the sum for large enough m. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.