Games for cautious players: The Equilibrium in Secure Strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iskakov, M.; Iskakov, A.; d'Aspremont, C.
• 署名单位: V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.011
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 58-70
• 关键词: Noncooperative games; Equilibrium existence; Equilibrium in secure strategies; Hotelling model; Tullock contest; Insurance market; Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly

摘要

A non-cooperative solution, the Equilibrium in Secure Strategies (EinSS), is defined as an extension of the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, and is meant to solve games where players are cautious, i.e., looking for secure positions and avoiding threats. This concept abstracts and unifies ad hoc solutions already formulated in various applied economic games that have been discussed extensively in the literature. A general existence theorem is provided and then applied to the price-setting game in the Hotelling location model, to Tullock's rent-seeking contests, and to Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly. Finally, competition in the insurance market game is re-examined and the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson contract is shown to be an EinSS even when the Nash equilibrium breaks down. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.