Common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games: A qualitative analysis

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonanno, Giacomo; Tsakas, Elias
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Davis; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.09.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 231-241
• 关键词: Ordinal payoffs; rationality; common belief; dominance; Iterated deletion procedure

摘要

We study common belief of weak-dominance rationality in strategic-form games with ordinal utilities, employing a qualitative model of beliefs. We characterize two standard solution concepts for such games: the Iterated Deletion of Borgers-dominated Strategies (IDBS) and the Iterated Deletion of Inferior Strategy Profiles (IDIP). We do so by imposing nested restrictions on the doxastic models: namely, the respective epistemic conditions differ in the fact that IDIP requires the truth axiom whereas IDBS does not. Hence, IDIP refines IDBS. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.