The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haimanko, Ori
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.05.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 391-400
• 关键词: Simple games; Banzhaf power index; Semivalues; 2-efficiency; Superadditivity; Transfer; symmetry; Positivity; Dummy

摘要

I introduce a new axiom for power indices on the domain of finite simple games that requires the total power of any given pair i. j of players in any given game v to be equivalent to some individual power, i.e., equal to the power of some single player k in some game w. I show that the Banzhaf power index is uniquely characterized by this new equivalence to individual power axiom in conjunction with the standard semivalue axioms: transfer (which is the version of additivity adapted for simple games), symmetry or equal treatment, positivity (which is strengthened to avoid zeroing-out of the index on some games), and dummy. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.