Membership separability: A new axiomatization of the Shapley value

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Clippel, Geoffroy
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.004
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 125-129
• 关键词: Cooperative games; Shapley value; axioms

摘要

The paper shows that Shapley's axiomatic characterization of his value can be strengthened considerably. Indeed, his additivity axiom can be replaced by a simple accounting property whereby a player's payoff is the difference of a reward based on the worth of coalitions to which she belongs, and a tax based on the worth of coalition to which she does not belong, without placing any restriction whatsoever on the functional relationship between the reward or the tax and the worths that determine them. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.