Dynamic communication with biased senders

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Margaria, Chiara; Smolin, Alex
• 署名单位: Boston University; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.017
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 330-339
• 关键词: Bayesian games; repeated games; COMMUNICATION; folk theorem

摘要

We study dynamic games in which senders with state-independent payoffs communicate to a single receiver. Senders' private information evolves according to an aperiodic and irreducible Markov chain. We prove an analog of a folk theorem that any feasible and individually rational payoff can be approximated in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient. In particular, there are equilibria in which the receiver makes perfectly informed decisions in almost every period, even if no informative communication can be sustained in the stage game. We conclude that repeated interaction can overcome strategic limits of communication. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.