A universal construction generating potential games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kukushkin, Nikolai S.
• 署名单位: Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS; Moscow Institute of Physics & Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.012
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 331-340
• 关键词: Potential game; Congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Game of social interactions; Additive aggregation

摘要

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain facilities. All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a trimness condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; conversely, if a facility is not trim, adding it to a potential game may destroy that property. In both congestion games and games with structured utilities, all facilities are trim. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.