Signaling to analogical reasoners who can acquire costly information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo
• 署名单位: IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.03.008
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 50-57
• 关键词: Analogical reasoning; Costly acquisition of information; Signaling without single crossing; Reverse separation

摘要

We show that separation in signaling games can be obtained without the single crossing condition, in a model where the receiver reasons analogically across a pair of states and can acquire costly information on the sender's type. Beyond ordinary separation (high type sends high signal, low type sends low signal) we find that also reverse separation is sustainable in equilibrium (high type sends low signal, low type sends high signal). Further, reverse separation in one state is obtained only if ordinary separation occurs in the other state. Pooling is possible and can go along with ordinary separation in one state. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.