A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amir, Rabah; Evstigneev, Igor V.
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; University of Manchester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 99-103
• 关键词: Price competition; Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium; Weakly dominated strategy; Non-monotonic demand

摘要

The paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the standard Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous product. The main condition is elementary, easy to interpret, and nests all known sufficient conditions in the literature. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.