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作者：Hoffmann, Eric J.; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; West Texas A&M University; University of Kansas
摘要：We extend the global games method to the class of finite player, finite action games that includes games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and arbitrary combinations of the two. Our result is based on common order properties present in both strategic complements and substitutes, the notion of p-dominance, and the use of dominance solvability as the solution concept. In addition to being closer to the original arguments in Carlsson and van Damme (1993), our approach ...
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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron
作者单位：Northwestern University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study the effect of rigid and flexible bid caps on contestants' aggregate costs and aggregate bids in all-pay contests with a large number of heterogeneous contestants and prizes. We show that rigid caps always decrease aggregate costs, whereas flexible caps have essentially no effect on aggregate costs. Rigid caps decrease aggregate bids when costs are linear or concave, but increase aggregate bids under some conditions when costs are convex. Flexible caps always decrease aggregate bids. (...
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作者：van Veelen, Matthijs; Garcia, Julian
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Monash University
摘要：We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. We begin by extending a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. Then we show that All D has a uniform invasion barrier. Since none of the more cooperative equilibria are robust against indirect invasions, we might expect not to observe any cooperative equilibria when complexity costs are positive. The average level of cooperation in the d...
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作者：Catonini, Emiliano
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents will play. If these theories are commonly known, players will refine their first-order beliefs and challenge their own theories through strategic reasoning. I propose a new solution concept, Selective Rationalizability, which captures the following hypothesis: when the observed behavior is not compatible with the beliefs in rationality and in the theories of all orders, players keep the beliefs in r...
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作者：Stephenson, Daniel
摘要：This study reports a continuous-time experimental test of evolutionary models in coordinated attacker-defender games. It implements three experimental treatment conditions: one with strong coordination incentives, one with weak coordination incentives, and one with zero coordination incentives. Each treatment exhibits identical equilibrium predictions but distinct evolutionary predictions. Observed behavior was tightly clustered around equilibrium under both the zero coordination treatment and...
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作者：Kayi, Cagatay; Ramaekers, Eve
作者单位：Universidad del Rosario; Universite Catholique Louvain
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作者：Shin, Euncheol
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：In many countries, three or more candidates compete against one another in single-office elections. I present a model of three candidates competing for a single office in which two candidates can form a coalition prior to the election (a pre-electoral coalition). Since the candidates are both policy- and office-motivated, one candidate can incentivize the other candidate to withdraw his candidacy by choosing a joint policy platform. I examine how electoral environments such as election rules, ...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin; Romm, Assaf
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Southern California; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：School districts that implement stable matchings face various decisions that affect students' assignments to schools. We study the properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences when schools use different tie-breaking rules to rank equivalent students. Under a single tie-breaking rule, where all schools use the same ranking, a constant fraction of students are assigned to one of their top choices. In contrast, under a multiple tie-breaking rule, where each school indep...
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作者：Shadmehr, Mehdi; Bernhardt, Dan
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of Calgary; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick
摘要：Revolutionary vanguards, their radicalism and coercive actions, and their interactions with ordinary citizens and the state are common threads in narratives of revolutionary movements. But what are the defining features of revolutionary vanguards? The literature is replete with terms that allude to some notion of a revolutionary vanguard (e.g., revolutionary entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs of violence, early -risers), but the essence of these conceptions and their implications for revolutionary p...
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作者：Guenther, Michael; Kuzmics, Christoph; Salomon, Antoine
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Bielefeld; University of Graz; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
摘要：In Renegotiation in Repeated Games (1989), J. Farrell and E. Maskin present, among other results, sufficient conditions for payoffs to be weakly renegotiation-proof'. We show that a step in the corresponding proof is not correct by giving a counterexample. We then provide a correct proof with slightly more demanding sufficient conditions. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
