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作者：Devanur, Nikhil R.; Hartline, Jason D.; Roughgarden, Tim
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作者：Dughmi, Shaddin; Ligett, Katrina; Lucier, Brendan
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作者：Huang, Zhiyi; Kim, Anthony
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Stanford University
摘要：We study online auctions with production costs using an online primal dual framework. The seller allocates items to buyers and can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a non-decreasing marginal cost per copy. The buyers have arbitrary valuation functions and arrive one by one online in some arbitrary order. The goal is to design an online mechanism that maximizes the social welfare, that is, the sum of the buyers' values less the total production cost. For any strictly convex and di...
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作者：Tabasso, Nicole
作者单位：University of Surrey; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：We introduce two pieces of information (memes) into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when agents meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at each meeting, which one depends on preferences over memes. We find that the conditions under which a unique meme becomes endemic are sufficient for both to become endemic. Segregation according to information preferences leads to polarization, i.e., nobody is informed of both memes, and a loss of infor...
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作者：Andersen, Jorgen Juel; Heggedal, Tom-Reiel
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Political parties committed to grab rents may run for election, and even win, if citizens are uninformed. But, how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search? We propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout. We show that: (i) the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies; (ii) the expectation of this rent distributi...
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作者：Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Private-order market institutions founded on trust-based relational contracts suffer adverse selection and moral hazard problems, while public-order market institutions have a limited capacity to enforce contracts. I model agent selection between contract enforcement institutions and demonstrate that the state's contract enforcement capacity is complementary to private-order contract enforcement institutions for low to moderate levels of public-order enforcement capacity. This suggests that in...
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作者：Chakraborty, Indranil
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper we ask a basic question that is interesting for auctioneers and regulators when multiple units are on sale. Should multiple identical units be sold simultaneously through a single-shot auction or sequentially? We consider the risk effect of such a decision on bidders and show that in the independent private values setting the answer unambiguously depends on the pricing rule. A bidder's payoff uncertainty increases when the sale is sequenced under a pay-as-bid rule, but decreases ...
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作者：Sawa, Ryoji
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：This study examines a dynamic process of n-person coalitional bargaining problems. We investigate the evolution of social conventions by embedding a coalitional bargaining setting in a dynamic process. In each period, a group of players may make some coalitional move, that is, forming a new team or negotiating the division of a surplus. Players revise their coalitions and surplus divisions over time in the presence of stochastic noise, which leads players to make a suboptimal decision. Under a...
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作者：Voecking, Berthold
作者单位：RWTH Aachen University
摘要：We present a randomized incentive-compatible polynomial-time approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions. For every fixed is an element of > 0, the approximation scheme provides a polynomial-time algorithm approximating the optimal social welfare within a factor of 1 - is an element of. Our mechanism is truthful in the universal sense, i.e., it is a distribution over deterministically truthful mechanisms. It employs VCG payments in a non-standard way as the underlying deterministic mechanisms...
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作者：Buechel, Berno; Mechtenberg, Lydia
作者单位：University of Fribourg; University of Hamburg
摘要：We study communication in social networks prior to a majority vote on two alternative policies. Some agents receive a private imperfect signal about which policy is correct. They can recommend a policy to their neighbors in the social network prior to the vote. We show theoretically and empirically that communication can undermine efficiency and hence reduce welfare in a common-interest setting. Both efficiency and existence of fully informative equilibria in which vote recommendations are tru...
