A note on Renegotiation in repeated games [Games Econ. Behay. 1 (1989) 327-360]

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guenther, Michael; Kuzmics, Christoph; Salomon, Antoine
• 署名单位: University of Bielefeld; University of Bielefeld; University of Graz; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 318-323
• 关键词: (Weak) renegotiation-proofness; Infinitely repeated games

摘要

In Renegotiation in Repeated Games (1989), J. Farrell and E. Maskin present, among other results, sufficient conditions for payoffs to be weakly renegotiation-proof'. We show that a step in the corresponding proof is not correct by giving a counterexample. We then provide a correct proof with slightly more demanding sufficient conditions. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.