Global games with strategic complements and substitutes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoffmann, Eric J.; Sabarwal, Tarun
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; West Texas A&M University; University of Kansas
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.007
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 72-93
• 关键词: Global games; Strategic complements; Strategic substitutes; monotone games; equilibrium selection

摘要

We extend the global games method to the class of finite player, finite action games that includes games with strategic complements, games with strategic substitutes, and arbitrary combinations of the two. Our result is based on common order properties present in both strategic complements and substitutes, the notion of p-dominance, and the use of dominance solvability as the solution concept. In addition to being closer to the original arguments in Carlsson and van Damme (1993), our approach requires fewer additional assumptions. In particular, we require only one dominance region, and no assumptions on state monotonicity, or aggregative structure, or overlapping dominance regions. As expected, the p-dominance condition becomes more restrictive as the number of players increases. In cases where the probabilistic burden in belief formation may be reduced, the p-dominance condition may be relaxed as well. We present examples that are not covered by existing results. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.