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作者：Ramalingam, Abhijit; Stoddard, Brock V.; Walker, James M.
作者单位：University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with 'divided loyalties', and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates 'winners' and 'losers'. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attractin...
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作者：de Marti, Joan; Milan, Pau
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We study global games of regime change within networks of truthful communication. Agents can choose between attacking and not attacking a status quo, whose strength is unknown. Players share private signals of the state with their immediate neighbors. Communication with neighbors introduces local correlations in posterior beliefs, and also pools information. In order to isolate the latter effect, we provide sparseness conditions on networks that allow for asymptotic approximations that elimina...
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作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts a la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Bergstrom, Ted; Garratt, Rodney; Leo, Greg
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Vanderbilt University
摘要：Simple game theoretic models suggest that when costly individual action can benefit an entire group, larger groups fare worse than smaller groups because of the free-rider problem arising from diffusion of responsibility. Nevertheless, there are conspicuous examples of large groups in which a minority of members voluntarily supply public goods that benefit the entire group. We propose that this happens because some people get pleasure from performing a good deed, even if others would be willin...
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作者：Bhaskar, Umang; Ligett, Katrina; Schulman, Leonard J.; Swamy, Chaitanya
作者单位：Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR); California Institute of Technology; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Waterloo; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：The analysis of network routing games typically assumes precise, detailed information about the latency functions. Such information may, however, be unavailable or difficult to obtain. Moreover, one is often primarily interested in enforcing a desired target flow as an equilibrium. We ask whether one can achieve target flows as equilibria without knowing the underlying latency functions. We give a crisp positive answer to this question. We show that one can efficiently compute edge tolls that ...
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作者：De, Parikshit; Mitra, Manipushpak
作者单位：Indian Institute of Science Education & Research (IISER) - Bhopal; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We address the balanced implementation issue for sequencing problems under incomplete information. For sequencing problems with more than two agents, we identify an important priority based sufficient class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfers. We also show that any linear sequencing rule is implementable with balanced transfers if and only if there are more than two agents. In the appendix we identify the complete class of rules that are implementable with balanced transfer...
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作者：Gong, Binglin; Yang, Chun-Lei
作者单位：East China Normal University; Nanjing Audit University
摘要：Amid rapidly growing globalization and digitalization, trades often occur in one-time encounters, where cooperation depends on indirect reciprocity. This study investigates how people use higher-order information to aid in cooperation decisions. A random matching prisoners' dilemma experiment with optional history information up to the second order is conducted. With a novel continuous extension, we show that reputation scores standing and judging significantly affect cooperation decisions. Ma...
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作者：Mihm, Maximilian; Ozbek, Kemal
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of St Andrews
摘要：In a dynamic choice environment, an agent's tastes may change over time (e.g., due to present bias, habit formation, or reference dependence). These changes are often systematic with important welfare and policy implications. In this paper, we propose a framework to identify an agent's anticipation about how her preferences change over time and provide a heuristic measure that can inform the design of economic policies. In particular, our method resolves identification issues arising in the pr...
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作者：Jeon, Doh-Shin; Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Florence
摘要：We study how the formation of a buyer group affects buyer power when sellers compete and buyers operate in separate markets. Previous research (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007, and Dana, 2012) has considered a buyer group that can commit to an exclusive purchase and has found that the formation of a buyer group strictly increases buyer power unless buyers have identical preferences. In contrast, we assume that no commitment to exclusive purchases is possible. We find that the formation of a buyer gr...
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作者：Schulman, Leonard J.; Vazirani, Umesh V.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We consider multiplayer games in which the players fall in two teams of size k, with payoffs equal within, and of opposite sign across, the two teams. In the classical case of k = 1, such zero-sum games possess a unique value, independent of order of play. However, this fails for all k> 1; we can measure this failure by a duality gap, which quantifies the benefit of being the team to commit last to its strategy. We show that the gap equals 2(1 21 k) for m = 2 and 2(1 m(-(1-0(1))k)) for m > 2, ...
