Assigning more students to their top choices: A comparison of tie-breaking rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Nikzad, Afshin; Romm, Assaf
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Southern California; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.015
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 167-187
• 关键词: School choice; Tie-breaking rule; deferred acceptance; stable matching

摘要

School districts that implement stable matchings face various decisions that affect students' assignments to schools. We study the properties of the rank distribution of students with random preferences when schools use different tie-breaking rules to rank equivalent students. Under a single tie-breaking rule, where all schools use the same ranking, a constant fraction of students are assigned to one of their top choices. In contrast, under a multiple tie-breaking rule, where each school independently ranks students, a vanishing fraction of students are matched with one of their top choices. However, if students are allowed to submit only relatively short preference lists under a multiple tie-breaking rule, a constant fraction of students will be matched with one of their top choices, while only a small fraction of students will remain unmatched. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.