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作者：Peters, Hans; Schroeder, Marc; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：Maastricht University; RWTH Aachen University
摘要：The estate division problem considers the issue of dividing an estate when the sum of entitlements is larger than the estate. This paper studies the estate division problem from a noncooperative perspective. The integer claim game introduced by O'Neill (1982) and extended by Atlamaz et al. (2011) is generalized by specifying a sharing rule to divide every interval among the claimants. We show that for all problems for which the sum of entitlements is at most twice the estate the existence of a...
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作者：Bavly, Gilad; Peretz, Ron
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study repeated games in which each player i is restricted to (mixtures of) strategies that can recall up to ki stages of history. Characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs boils down to identifying the individually rational level (punishment level) of each player. In contrast to the classic folk theorem, in which players are unrestricted, punishing a bounded player may involve correlation between the punishers' actions. We show that the extent of such correlation is at most proportional...
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作者：Talamas, Eduard
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Different sellers often sell the same good at different prices. Using a strategic bargaining model, I characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction between its sellers' costs, its buyers' values, and a network capturing various frictions associated with trading it. In contrast to the standard random-matching model of bargaining in stationary markets, I allow agents to strategically choose whom to make offers to, which qualitatively changes how the network shapes p...
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作者：Inal, Hakan
作者单位：Volvo
摘要：In coalition formation games with arbitrary collection of permissible coalitions, a top/stable-coalition condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique core partition, strengthening uniqueness results both in Pycia (2012) and in Banerjee et al. (2001). (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Norde, Henk
作者单位：Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper two cost sharing solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems are introduced, the degree adjusted folk solution and the cost adjusted folk solution. These solutions overcome the problem of the classical reductionist folk solution as they have considerable strict ranking power, without breaking established axioms. As such they provide an affirmative answer to an open question, put forward in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010). (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper is concerned with preference-aggregation rules satisfying desirable efficiency and solidarity requirements. We formulate weaker versions of existing solidarity axioms and show how they imply, in conjunction with strategy-proofness, the existence of reference outcomes holding privileged status. We propose a new class of rules, fixed-order status-quo rules, that can be productively contrasted to their closest counterparts in the literature, status-quo rules based on the least upper bo...
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作者：Munro, David R.; Rassenti, Stephen J.
作者单位：Middlebury College; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：The lack of price guidance towards efficiency relevant packages in ascending combinatorial clock auctions (ACCA) can lead to a low-efficiency allocation of goods. We propose a descending price combinatorial clock auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to improve on this problem. Using agent-based simulations we document that the DCCA provides significant improvements over the ACCA and we are able to understand in which environments these improvements are likely to be the stronges...
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作者：Csoka, Peter; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Maastricht University
摘要：We analyze the question of how to distribute the asset value of an insolvent firm among its creditors and the firm itself. Compared to standard bankruptcy games as studied in the game-theoretic literature, we treat the firm as a player and define a new class of transferable utility games called liability games. We show that the core of a liability game is empty. We analyze the nucleolus of the game. The firm always gets a positive payment, at most equal to half of the asset value. Creditors wi...
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作者：Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Koriyama, Yukio; Sutan, Angela; Willinger, Marc
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Cote d'Azur; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Universite Paris Saclay; Universite Marie et Louis Pasteur; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Montpellier; Institut Agro; Montpellier SupAgro; INRAE
摘要：Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly more from the Nash equilibrium when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes. This strategic environment effect offers promising insights into the aggregate consequences of interactions among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents, but its macroeconomic implications have been questioned because the underlying experiments involve a small number of agents. We studied beauty cont...
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作者：Milchtaich, Igal
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：Polyequilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium that is applicable to any strategic game, whether finite or otherwise, and to dynamic games, with perfect or imperfect information. It differs from equilibrium in specifying strategies that players do not choose and by requiring an after-the-fact justification for the exclusion of these strategies rather than the retainment of the non-excluded ones. Specifically, for each excluded strategy of each player there must be a non-excluded one t...
