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作者：Chun, Youngsub; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
摘要：We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sitzia, Stefania; Zheng, Jiwei
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals...
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作者：Trost, Michael
作者单位：University Hohenheim
摘要：In this paper, we detect meaningful properties of choice rules ensuring that the solution generated by iterated application of choice rules specifies the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow these rules and commonly believe this. Our main result is based on four substantial assumptions on choice rules. Whenever the players' choices rules satisfy - besides the technical assumption of regularity - the properties of reflexivity, monotonicity, Aizerman's property, and the...
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作者：Dimakopoulos, Philipp D.; Heller, C. -Philipp
摘要：We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used Berlin mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficien...
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作者：Evren, Ozgur
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：I study how risk preferences and the level of ambiguity influence ambiguity attitudes in Uzi Segal's recursive second-order non-expected utility model. It is shown that the negative certainty independence axiom for risk preferences is equivalent to a global form of ambiguity aversion that entails ambiguity averse behavior irrespective of the state space and the decision maker's second-order belief. Thus, the second-order version of the cautious expected utility model is the only subclass of Se...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A seller owns a firm and privately knows its underlying value. She can exert a costly hidden effort over time to affect a noisy signal. Arriving competitive buyers use the history of signals to infer the value of the firm and make price offers. We show that the degree of efficiency of sending highly-informative signals plays a crucial role in shaping how information is transmitted. If exerting a high signaling effort is efficient, the seller of a high-value firm responds to bad luck by increas...
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作者：Jiang, Lianjie; Wu, Jiabin
作者单位：University of Oregon
摘要：We revisit Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) model of reciprocity in sequential games. One important assumption they make is that players' perception of their opponents' kindness depends on their most updated beliefs at their decision nodes along the game. We argue that this is not always the case. We propose a modified belief-updating rule that categorizes beliefs by whether perceived kindness is calculated using their most updated forms. We use a simple example to demonstrate how equilibr...
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作者：Lagziel, David
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：In this paper we offer two contributions to the field of credit auctions. First, we compare first- and second-price credit auctions and provide solvency-dependent conditions such that one mechanism dominates the other in terms of expected payoffs of all the parties involved. In addition, we present a new possibility of using bid caps in credit auctions. We study the equilibria in the capped mechanisms and show that bid caps can increase the seller's expected payoff and, in some cases, the expe...
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作者：Tsay, Min-Hung; Yeh, Chun-Hsien
作者单位：National Chung Cheng University; Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We consider the bankruptcy problem, in which the liquidation value of a bankrupt firm has to be allocated among its creditors. By applying the Nash program to justify a bilaterally consistent rule, bilateral negotiations are traditionally resolved by applying the rule (Dagan et al., 1997: Chang and Hu, 2008). We introduce games in which bilateral negotiations are resolved by non-cooperative bargaining procedures and show that these games strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule,...
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作者：Metzger, Lars Peter; Rieger, Marc Oliver
作者单位：Dortmund University of Technology; Universitat Trier
摘要：We investigate a framework for non-cooperative games in normal form where players have behavioral preferences following Prospect Theory (PT) or Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). On theoretical grounds CPT is usually considered to be the superior model, since it normally does not violate first order stochastic dominance in lottery choices. We find, however, that CPT when applied to games may select purely dominated strategies, while PT does not. For both models we also characterize the cases wh...
