A model of pre-electoral coalition formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shin, Euncheol
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 463-485
• 关键词: Opinion polls; Plurality rule; Pre-electoral coalition; strategic voting; Two-round runoff rules

摘要

In many countries, three or more candidates compete against one another in single-office elections. I present a model of three candidates competing for a single office in which two candidates can form a coalition prior to the election (a pre-electoral coalition). Since the candidates are both policy- and office-motivated, one candidate can incentivize the other candidate to withdraw his candidacy by choosing a joint policy platform. I examine how electoral environments such as election rules, ideological distance, and pre-election polls influence incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions. I find that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form (i) in plurality elections than in two-round runoff elections, (ii) as the threshold for first-round victory decreases in two-round runoff elections, (iii) as the two potential coalition partners' ideological distance increases, conditional on divided support, and (iv) as the fraction of office value which is transferable increases. Moreover, I analyze and compare voter welfare under plurality and the two-round runoff rules. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.