In and out of equilibrium II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van Veelen, Matthijs; Garcia, Julian
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Monash University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.013
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 113-130
• 关键词: Repeated games; Complexity costs; Neutrally stable strategy; Robust against indirect invasions; Uniform invasion barrier; Wright-Fisher process

摘要

We explore evolutionary dynamics for repeated games with small, but positive complexity costs. We begin by extending a folk theorem result by Cooper (1996) to continuation probabilities, or discount rates, smaller than 1. Then we show that All D has a uniform invasion barrier. Since none of the more cooperative equilibria are robust against indirect invasions, we might expect not to observe any cooperative equilibria when complexity costs are positive. The average level of cooperation in the dynamics, however, can hover anywhere between no cooperation at all, and the average level of cooperation in the absence of complexity costs, depending on how small complexity costs are and how large the population is. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.