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作者：Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew
作者单位：Cornell University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Consider a gambler who observes a sequence of independent random numbers and is allowed to stop at any time, claiming reward equal to the most recent observation. The famous prophet inequality of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling asserts that a gambler who knows the distribution of each random variable can achieve half as much reward, in expectation, as a prophet who knows the sampled values and can choose the largest one. We generalize this result to settings in which the gambler and the prophe...
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作者：Liu, Shuo
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while the intuitive but inefficient follow-the-expert strategy profile almost always does. Although more information may be aggregated if agents are able to coordi...
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作者：Hirai, Toshiyuki; Watanabe, Naoki; Muto, Shigeo
作者单位：University of Toyama; Keio University; Tokyo University of Science; Hosei University
摘要：This paper analyzes the negotiations made by an external patent holder and potential licensee firms in a new model of patent licensing, assuming that they are all farsighted, and characterizes the symmetric farsighted stable sets. Given a net profit of each licensee firm, a set of outcomes is a symmetric farsighted stable set if and only if, at any outcome in the set, each licensee firm receives the net profit and the number of licensee firms maximizes the patent holder's profit provided that ...
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作者：Brownback, Andy; Kuhn, Michael A.
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Oregon
摘要：Disentangling effort and luck is critical when evaluating outcomes. In a principal-agent experiment, we demonstrate that principals' judgments of agents are biased by luck, despite perfectly observable effort. This erodes the power of incentives to stimulate effort. We explore two potential solutions to this outcome bias-information control, and outsourcing judgment to independent third parties. Both are ineffective. When principals control information about luck, they do not avoid it. When ag...
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作者：Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Keio University
摘要：In one-sided matching/assignment problems, an important debate centers around whether it is possible to improve upon the Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) via alternative strategy-proof mechanisms. In unrestricted preference domains, no strategy-proof mechanism Pareto improves upon DA whether students have outside options or not. When standard exogenous outside options, e.g., private school, do not necessarily exist, we show that endogenous outside options, i.e....
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作者：Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Dufwenberg, Martin; Papa, Stefano; Passarelli, Francesco
作者单位：Sapienza University Rome; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Turin; Bocconi University
摘要：Why do people keep their promises? Vanberg (2008) and Ederer and Stremitzer (2017) provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one's word and Charness and Dufwenberg's (2006) expectations-based account based on guilt aversion. The overall picture is incomplete though, as no study disentangles effects in a design that provides exogenous variation of both (the key features of) promises and beliefs. We report evidence from an experimental design that doe...
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作者：Ghosh, Gagan; Liu, Heng
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study an auction game in which two units of a good are sold via two second-price auctions sequentially to three or more bidders who have private budgets that limit their spending in the auctions. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium. In equilibrium, while bidders bid the minimum of their valuations and budgets in the second auction, their aggression in the first round depends on two factors: the competition from other bidders, as measured by the probability of facing high budget...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Mui, Vai-Lam
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Monash University
摘要：We study experimentally the indefinitely repeated noisy prisoner's dilemma, in which random events can change an intended action to its opposite. We investigate whether groups choose Always Defect less and use lenient or forgiving strategies more than individuals, and how decision-makers experiment with different strategies by letting them choose from an extensive list of repeated game strategies. We find that groups use forgiving and tit-for-tat strategies more than individuals. Always Defect...
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T.; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Bath
摘要：We examine the effects of a novel political institution called Coalition Preclusion Contracts (CPCs) on the functioning of parliamentary democracies with proportional representation. CPCs enable political parties to credibly exclude one or several parties from the range of government coalitions they are prepared to envisage after elections. We consider a simple political game with a two-dimensional policy space in which three parties compete to form the government. We find that CPCs with a one...
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作者：Pan, Siqi
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：Many centralized college admissions markets allocate seats to students based on their performance on a single standardized exam. The exam's measurement error can cause the exam-derived priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences. Previous literature proposes to combine pre-exam preference submission with a Boston algorithm (a PreExam-BOS mechanism). This paper examines the proposed mechanism in an experiment where students are not fully informed of their relative aptitudes....
