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作者：Duffy, John; Hopkins, Ed; Kornienko, Tatiana; Ma, Mingye
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Edinburgh; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We document heterogeneity of rationality and bias in information acquisition in a social learning experiment, where subjects, prior to guessing an unknown binary state of the world, must choose between receiving a private signal or seeing social information containing the guesses made by previous subjects in the sequence - rather than observing both pieces of information as in the classic design of Anderson and Holt (1997). By requiring subjects to make this information choice at different poi...
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作者：Corazzini, Luca; Galavotti, Stefano; Valbonesi, Paola
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Bocconi University; Universita degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro; University of Padua; University of Padua; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We experimentally study sequential procurement auctions where bidders' capacity constraints are private information. Our experiment involves two first-price auctions with a belief elicitation stage at the end of the first. Our results show that (i) observed behavior in the second auction is overall consistent with sequential rationality; (ii) first auction bids are decreasing in the capacity of the bidder, but (iii) stated beliefs are inconsistent with the actual play. Hence, subjects seem to ...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper investigates the welfare effects of private investments prior to trade. A seller of a durable good can privately invest on changing its quality. After the investment, she receives a take-it-or-leave-it offer from a buyer. Both the seller and the buyer value more goods of higher quality. We obtain that, in equilibrium, the seller mixes the investment choice, adding adverse selection to the exchange. The non-observability of the investment diminishes the buyer's payoff without giving ...
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作者：Richter, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper finds welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning a divisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents who have independently distributed private valuations and budgets without unit-demand. Both optimal mechanisms feature a linear price for the good. The welfare-maximizing mechanism additionally has a uniform lump-sum transfer to all agents and a higher linear price than the revenue-maximizing mechanism. This transfer increases welfare because it ameliorates th...
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作者：Chawla, Shuchi; Hartline, Jason D.; Sivan, Balasubramanian
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the design and approximation of optimal crowdsourcing contests. Crowdsourcing contests can be modeled as all-pay auctions because entrants must exert effort up-front to enter. Unlike all-pay auctions where a usual design objective would be to maximize revenue, in crowdsourcing contests, the principal only benefits from the submission with the highest quality. We give a theory for optimal crowdsourcing contests that mirrors the theory of optimal auction design: the optimal crowdsourcin...
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作者：Fiat, Amos; Koutsoupias, Elias; Ligett, Katrina; Mansour, Yishay; Olonetsky, Svetlana
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; National & Kapodistrian University of Athens; University of Oxford; California Institute of Technology; California Institute of Technology
摘要：The Nash equilibrium as a prediction myopically ignores the possibility that deviating from the equilibrium could lead to an avalanche of beneficial changes by other agents. We consider a non-myopic version of Cournot competition, where each firm selects either profit maximization (as in the classical model) or revenue maximization (by masquerading as a firm with zero production costs). We consider many non-identical firms with linear demand functions and show existence of pure Nash equilibria...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Kovenock, Dan; Malueg, David A.; Topolyan, Iryna
作者单位：Tulane University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of California System; University of California Riverside; University System of Ohio; University of Cincinnati
摘要：We study weakest-link group contests with private information. We characterize all pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibria: various degrees of coordination are possible, from every cost type choosing a distinct effort level to all cost types coordinating on a single effort level. Such coordination may not enhance welfare. If groups are symmetric except for group size, players in the smaller group bid more aggressively than those in the larger group, but when asymmetries regard multiple dimensions,...
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作者：Dato, Simon; Feess, Eberhard; Nieken, Petra
作者单位：University of Bonn; Victoria University Wellington; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：We extend the literature on the determinants of lying to the impact of reciprocity in strategic interactions. We study a theoretical model with reciprocity by assuming that a player's degree of altruism depends on her perception of the other player's altruism towards herself. Specifically, we consider a sequential two-player-contest and vary the second mover's degree of information on the first movers lying behavior. This yields predictions on the second mover's behavior which we study in a la...
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作者：Pei, Ting; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：We study point-rationalizable and rationalizable strategies in random games. In a random n x n symmetric game, an explicit formula is derived for the distribution of the number of point-rationalizable strategies, which is of the order root n in probability as n -> infinity. The number of rationalizable strategies depends on the payoff distribution, and is bounded by the number of point-rationalizable strategies (lower bound), and the number of strategies that are not strictly dominated by a pu...
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作者：Tesoriere, Antonio
作者单位：University of Palermo
摘要：For pools of essential patents I study whether a pool's sharing rule is stable against arbitrage, so that the pool's members have no incentive to trade patents. I show that the only stable rule is the numeric proportional rule, which gives each member a share of the pool's profit equal to its share of the pool's patents. I study how the stable rule affects firms' incentives to participate, and I show that firms with few patents tend to remain outside the pool. I look at the trade off between s...
