Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Szkup, Michal; Trevino, Isabel
• 署名单位: University of British Columbia; University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.09.008
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 534-553
• 关键词: Global games; COORDINATION; information structures; strategic uncertainty; Sentiments; Biased beliefs

摘要

We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects' behavior approximates the efficient equilibrium of the game, not the risk dominant one. We hypothesize that sentiments in the perception of strategic uncertainty could drive our results. To formalize this hypothesis we extend the standard model by introducing sentiments and we test this mechanism experimentally by eliciting beliefs. We find empirical support for our hypothesis: Subjects are over-optimistic about the actions of others when the signal precision is high and over-pessimistic when it is low. Thus, we show how changes in the information structure can give rise to sentiments that drastically affect outcomes in coordination games. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.