Communication via intermediaries

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kwiek, Maksymilian
• 署名单位: University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 190-203
• 关键词: Inattention; COMMUNICATION; Information theory

摘要

A model of communication with two features is presented: inattentive receivers, who are heterogeneous in their inattention, and the intermediaries, whose preferences are not aligned with each other or with the preferences of the initial sender. The sender faces a dilemma how to shape her message to maneuver the intermediaries into telling the final receivers what she considers important. A sincere communication policy and competition between the intermediaries are optimal if three conditions hold: the intermediaries have opposite preferences as to what the final receivers should learn, they are symmetric in their communication capacities and the sender is benevolent towards final receivers. Otherwise, the sender may benefit from a more hands-on intervention-selecting a self-censoring communication policy over sincerity or a single intermediary over competition. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.