The sophistication of conditional cooperators: Evidence from public goods games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fallucchi, Francesco; Luccasen, R. Andrew, III; Turocy, Theodore L.
• 署名单位: University of Bergamo; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.004
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 31-62
• 关键词: Public goods; Conditional cooperation; Sophistication; experiment

摘要

We extend the study of behavioural types in voluntary contribution games, adapting the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) to a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. Our results in the standard VCM game align with previous findings in many respects; in particular, we identify one-quarter of participants as a distinctive group of strong conditional cooperators. We provide an explanation for the behaviour of this group by tracking their contribution strategies as the financial incentives of the game vary. We find that conditional cooperators follow a sophisticated rule, matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. This favours an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, rather than confusion, inequity aversion, or warm-glow giving.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).